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Abstract
11
In this paper we discuss an economic model for resource sharing in large-scale distributed systems. The model captures traditional concepts
such as consumer satisfaction and provider revenues and enables us to analyze the effect of different pricing strategies upon measures of 13
performance important for the consumers and the providers. We show that given a particular set of model parameters the satisfaction reaches
an optimum; this value represents the perfect balance between the utility and the price paid for resources. Our results conﬁrm that brokers play 15
a very important role and can inﬂuence positively the market. We also show that consumer satisfaction does not track the consumer utility,
these two important performance measures for consumers behave differently under different pricing strategies. Pricing strategies also affect the 17
revenues obtained by providers, as well as, the ability to satisfy a larger population of users.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 19
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1. Introduction and motivation
Computational, service, and data grids, peer-to-peer systems, 23
and ad hoc wireless networks are examples of open systems.
Individual members of the community contribute computing 25
cycles, storage, services, and communication bandwidth to the
pool of resources available to the entire community; resources 27
as well as consumers of resources could belong to different ad-
ministrative domains. In this case it is difﬁcult to devise global 29
resource allocation policies and there is no central authority to
enforce global policies and schedules. The existence of multi- 31
ple administrative domains is a reality in the Grid environments
and the Internet. In the context of our research, each adminis- 33
trative domain corresponds to a different organization and has
complete control of its resources and dictates the price and the 35
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amount of resources available. A broker mediates between pro- 37
ducers and consumers in different administrative domains. The
research reported in this paper investigates the use of macroe- 39
conomic models for resource allocation in heterogeneous, dis-
tributed computing, and communication systems. 41
Market-oriented economies have proved their advantages
over alternative means to control and manage resource alloca- 43
tion in social systems [8]. It seems reasonable to adapt some
of the successful ideas of economical models to resource allo- 45
cation in large-scale computing systems and to study market-
oriented resource allocation algorithms. As shown by recent 47
studies, economic models are attractive for resource providers,
beneﬁcial for the consumers of resources, and have societal 49
beneﬁts for large-scale distributed systems [42–44]. Fewer
resources are wasted, while excess capacity and overloading 51
are averaged over a very large number of providers and con-
sumers. The system is more scalable and decision-making is 53
distributed. In an economic model, all participants are con-
sidered self-interested. The resource providers are trying to 55
Please cite this article as: X. Bai, et al., A macroeconomic model for resource allocation in large-scale distributed systems, J. Parallel Distrib. Comput.
(2007), doi: 10.1016/j.jpdc.2007.07.001UNCORRECTED PROOF
2 X. Bai et al. / J. Parallel Distrib. Comput. ( ) –
ARTICLE IN PRESS
maximize their revenues. The consumers want to obtain the 1
maximum possible resources for the minimum possible price.
Thelargenumberofparticipantsmakesone-to-onenegotiations 3
expensive and unproductive.
In 1933 the Norwegian economist and Nobel laure- 5
ate Ragnar Frisch introduced the dichotomy macroecon-
omy/microeconomy [17]. Macroeconomics deals with the 7
economy as a whole and studies aggregate trends such as to-
tal consumption and production [37], while microeconomics 9
is primarily focused on the economic behavior of individual
units and the role of prices in allocation of scarce resources 11
[40]. While in our model we simulate the individual customers
and producers, the objectives are to improve the aggregate 13
utility and satisfaction of the entire user population and all
the resources of the distributed system. Thus, it seems more 15
appropriate to call it a macroeconomic model.
The model presented in this paper is based upon concepts 17
borrowed from economics, such as utility and consumer sat-
isfaction. Informally, utility quantiﬁes the beneﬁts obtained 19
as the result of being granted a certain amount of resources.
Utility-based resource allocation models have proved their 21
potential in a different context, e.g., when the only resource
is the radio bandwidth, the size of the population is lim- 23
ited, and each participant has a unique role (e.g., is a con-
sumer) [4]. The heterogeneity of a large-scale distributed 25
system, the large spectrum of resources and demands placed
upon these resources, the scale of the system, the autonomy 27
of individual resource providers, and the dual role of indi-
vidual actors, as consumer of some resources and provider 29
for others, add complexity to the models we study in this
paper. 31
Different utility functions can be considered; a utility func-
tion should be: (i) monotonically increasing with the amount of 33
allocated resource; (ii) convex for high resource values; and (iii)
fast growing for small amounts of allocated resources. Increas- 35
ing the resource allocation will yield lower and lower increase
in utility. Intuitively, this is justiﬁed by Amdalh’s law: once a 37
resource is plentiful, the performance bottleneck moves to an-
other type of resource, and adding additional resource yields 39
little beneﬁt. These observations lead us to conclude that the
utility function will have an S-shaped, sigmoid curve. Sigmoid 41
functions have all the desirable properties and have been used
in many economic models, in biology, and some other areas, 43
as we discuss in Section 3.
In our model, each resource is characterized by a vector with 45
several components. In the general case, a request may require
multiple resources or resources with multiple attributes. Thus, 47
more general utility functions are surfaces in hyperspaces with
several dimensions. A discussion of the relative advantages of 49
different families of utility functions is an important and timely
subject, but beyond the scope of this paper. While the sigmoid 51
is selected for us here, it could be replaced by other functions
within the framework of our model. 53
We deﬁne a measure of consumer’s satisfaction that takes
into account the utility resulting from resource consumption 55
and the price paid by the consumer. We show that given a
particular set of model parameters the satisfaction reaches an 57
optimum; this value represents the perfect balance between the
utility and the price paid for resources. 59
Consumer satisfaction is a more general metric than QoS that
typically refers to a single performance measure (e.g., time to 61
completion or end-to-end delay), and does not reﬂect pricing.
Moreover, QoS requirements are generally speciﬁed by an up- 63
per bound (e.g., the jitter should be less than m milliseconds),
while one can provide a continuous function describing the util- 65
ity and select a provider that optimizes the satisfaction value,
or one that is very close to the optimum. 67
We also show that consumer satisfaction does not track the
consumer utility; these two important performance measures 69
for consumers behave differently under different pricing strate-
gies. Pricing strategies also affect the revenues obtained by 71
providers, as well as the request acceptance ratio. We introduce
three pricing policies and investigate the effect of several pa- 73
rameters upon critical measures of performance for producers
and consumers. The pricing policies are affected by the rela- 75
tionship between the amount of resources required and the total
amount we pay for them, as well as the overall state of the sys- 77
tem. We analyze the case when the price per unit is constant
regardless of the amount of resources consumed (linear pric- 79
ing); pricing to encourage consumption, i.e., the more resources
are used the lower becomes the average unit price (sub-linear 81
pricing); and pricing to discourage consumption, i.e., the more
resources are used the higher becomes the average unit price 83
(super-linear pricing). We also analyze the effect of resource
abundance upon pricing strategies. 85
We foresee an adaptive and intelligent user behavior based
upon the idea that, in the general case, the same goal may be 87
achieved through different means. We suggest the transforma-
tion of imperative requests into elastic ones that reﬂect the level 89
of utility. Practically, we specify a range of target systems, e.g.,
clusters with 100–10,000 nodes, and for each potential target of 91
an elastic request we compute a satisfaction value and choose
the one leading to the largest satisfaction. Assume that we pro- 93
cess a very large number of images and could use a variety of
system conﬁgurations each with its own utility and the corre- 95
sponding satisfaction value. Our best option is to use a cluster
with 10,000 nodes with 4GB of memory per node, but there 97
are only a few such systems; at the other extreme, we could
use a cluster more likely to be available soon with only 100 99
nodes and 2GB of main memory per node, but the execution
time would increase by four orders of magnitude. An elastic 101
request quantiﬁes the urgency of the request and allows the
broker and/or the user to compare the satisfaction values and 103
decide whether to pay a higher price for a unique resource, or
use a readily available one. 105
Several models including ours include middlemen to mediate
access to resources a strategy rather common for agent systems. 107
The role of a broker is to reconcile the selﬁsh objectives of
individual resource providers and consumers with some global, 109
societal objectives, e.g., to maximize the resource utilization of
the system. 111
The best analogy for a broker in our model is a ﬁnancial
advisor in the real world. Clients trust their ﬁnancial advisors 113
and disclose their ﬁnancial objectives (corresponding to the
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utility and satisfaction functions) to them. At the same time, the 1
clients know and accept the fact that the ﬁnancial advisor will
act in the context of existing laws and stock market regulations, 3
thus, it also serves societal objectives.
Most macroeconomic models include policy makers that es- 5
tablish societal objectives. For example the Federal Reserve
Board establishes monetary policies in the US and there are 7
counterparts in other countries. In a global economy the policy
makers sometimes coordinate their behavior. In the future our 9
simulation studies should be extended to include policy makers
and multiple brokers. 11
Our results conﬁrm that brokers play a very important role
and can inﬂuence positively the market. The development of 13
broker-to-broker coordination models and an analysis of a more
complex system is well beyond the scope of this paper due to 15
the complexity of the analysis and space limitations. As ex-
pected, even with a set of simplifying assumptions, the mod- 17
els are extremely complex and can only be evaluated through
simulation. 19
The contributions of this paper are: (i) a macroeconomic
model that includes policy makers whose role is to establish 21
societal objectives, trusted middleman whose role is to ensure
maximum satisfaction to their clients, and producers and con- 23
sumers of resources; (ii) utility and satisfaction functions, as
well as pricing policies; and (iii) a simulation study of the be- 25
havior of a system with a single broker.
The paper is organized as follows: we survey different eco- 27
nomic models applied to information systems in Section 2 and
compare their features with our model. In Section 3, we in- 29
troduce the basic elements of our model and deﬁne utility and
satisfaction function, as well as pricing strategies. The role of 31
the middlemen is discussed in Section 4 and the results of a
simulation study are analyzed in Section 5; ﬁnally, we present 33
our conclusions in Section 6.
2. Related work 35
The development of the ﬁrst global macroeconomic model,
the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates LINK 37
project, started in 1968 under the leadership of Nobel laureate
Lawrence Klein [31]. There are two basic analytical approaches 39
to classical macroeconomics: (a) Keynesian economics focused
on demand and (b) supply-side economics focused on supply. 41
Interestingly enough, the most complex information system
ever conceived, the Internet, takes advantage of ideas that can 43
be traced back to macroeconomics. While the Internet is based
upon a best effort service model, supply-side economics are 45
reﬂected by overprovisioning, namely building an excess band-
width to ensure some levels of QoS. 47
Frank Kelly developed in late 1990s an analytical model for
a self-managed Internet based upon utility and cost [26]. Kelly 49
considers a set of sessions s ∈ S that use a set of links l ∈ L;
each link l has a capacity C.I fLs is the set of links used by 51
session s, then Us(rs),S ∈ Ls is a strictly concave, increasing
function of the packet source rate, rs. He attempts to maximize 53
system utility with the constraint that the total bandwidth used
on each link by all connections is lower than the link capacity. If 55
ps is the price function of the rate, then a distributed algorithm
solves a greedy optimization problem for every session: 57
maxUs(rs) − psrs.
It turns out that the adaptive congestion control mechanism 59
introduced in early 1980s for TCP can be well described by
Kelly’s model developed in late 1990s; the price in this case 61
is the probability of losing packets and the utility is a simple
function of the round trip time (RTT). 63
Extending Kelly’s model to a large-scale distributed system
consisting of a collection of heterogeneous systems, while fea- 65
sible, would be rather impractical; the need to differentiate ser-
vices for individual consumers and specify a different utility 67
function for each one of them, the variety of prices and the
fact that individual entities are consumers and providers at the 69
same time, makes such an extension very hard and possibly
infeasible computationally. 71
Even though theoretical studies of economic models applied
to information systems are only now beginning to emerge, sev- 73
eral companies including IBM (E-Business On Demand [24]),
HP (Adaptive Enterprise [23]), Sun Microsystems (pay-as-you- 75
go [39]), as well as startups such as Entropia, ProcessTree,
Popular Power, Mojo Nation, United Devices, and Parabon are 77
embedding economics into their resource allocation systems.
Economic concepts and ideas are used for distributed storage 79
systems such as the Stanford Peers Initiative [15] and GnuNet
[20] and distributed databases [3,38]. Java Market [2], JaWS 81
[27], Xenoservers [32], and others apply economic models for
computer services. 83
The economic concepts and strategies embedded in exist-
ing or proposed systems and models [11,12] are summarized 85
in Table 1 and surveyed below. An auction starts with own-
ers announcing resources and inviting bids; consumers bid and 87
the winner gets access to the resource. In an English auction,
when no bidder is willing to increase the bid, the auction ends 89
and the highest bidder wins; in ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction,
every bidder submits a sealed bid and the highest bidder wins; 91
in a Vickrey auction, every bidder submits a sealed bid and the
highest bidder wins at the price of the second highest bidder; a 93
Dutch auction starts with a high price lowered until a bidder is
willing to pay the current price. In bid-based proportional re- 95
source sharing the percentage of resources allocated is a func-
tion of user’s bid relative to others. Bargaining requires direct 97
negotiations between producers and consumers until they reach
a mutually agreeable price. Bartering is conducted among the 99
members of a community that share each other’s resources. In
commodity markets, providers advertise their resource prices 101
and charge users based on the amount of resources used; posted
price allows providers to advertise special offers to attract con- 103
sumers. In case of a monopoly, one or a small number of re-
source providers decide a non-negotiable the price. Pricing pol- 105
icy could be based on a ﬂat fee, the resource usage duration,
the subscription, the demand and supply [29], or could be de- 107
signed to encourage or discourage consumption.
Arguments that commodities markets are better choices for 109
controlling grid resources than auction strategies are presented
in [43,44] based upon concepts such as price stability, market 111
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Table 1
Economic concepts and strategies in different systems
System Au Ba Bt Cm Co Mo Ut Cs Pr Results
ContractNet [36] Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Deployed
Condor [14] No No No Yes No No No No Yes Deployed
Enhanced MOSIX [1] No No No No No No Yes No Yes Simulated
Mariposa [28] (based on the Contract Net) Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Prototype
Rexec/Anemone [13] No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes Prototype
SETI@home [33] No No No Yes No No No No No Deployed
Spawn [42] Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes Prototype
Sun [39]) No No No Yes No No No No No Deployed
Our model No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Simulation
Abbreviations: Au–Auction; Ba–Bargaining; Bt–Bartering; Cm–Commodity market; Co–Coalition; Mo–Monopoly; Ut–Utility; Cs–Consumer satisfaction; Pr–
Pricing policy; Results–performance results reported in literature, Analitical/simulation.
equilibrium, consumer efﬁciency, and provider efﬁciency. An 1
approach to implement automatic selection of multiple nego-
tiation models to adapt to the computation needs and changes 3
in a resource environment is discussed in [34]. A task-oriented
mechanism for measuring the economic value of using hetero- 5
geneous resources as a common currency is analyzed in [21];
resource consumers can compare the advantage of participat- 7
ing in a computational grid with the alternative of purchasing
their own resources necessary, and resource providers can eval- 9
uate the proﬁt of putting their resources into a grid. A compar-
ative analysis of market-based resource allocation by continu- 11
ous double auctions and by the proportional share protocol vs.
a conventional round-robin approach is presented in [19]. 13
A game-theoretic approach is used to develop pricing strat-
egy for efﬁcient job allocation in mobile grids [18] as well as 15
grid resource allocation models [25]. A risk analysis is carried
out by a service provider to balance its objectives and earn a 17
proﬁt, while meeting the service level agreement and maintain-
ingthereliabilityoftheservice[45].QoSandbudgetconsidera- 19
tionsareincorporatedintheﬁtnessofageneticalgorithm-based
scheduler for scientiﬁc workﬂows on the utility Grid [46]. 21
Table1summarizesthekeyfeaturesofavarietyofeconomic-
based systems for resource allocation. Our approach differs 23
fromothermodelsinthatitisbaseduponutilityandsatisfaction
functions and pricing policies. 25
3. Basic concepts
An efﬁcient and fair utilization of the resources can be 27
obtained only through a scheme that gives incentives to the
providers to share their resources and that encourages the con- 29
sumers to maximize the utility of the received resources. A
well-tested model for such a scheme is based on an economic 31
model, in which the resources need to be paid for in a real
or virtual currency. This model has the advantage of being 33
provably scalable, and we can successfully reuse or adapt the
models that govern the economy in our society. 35
To study possible resource management policies, we have to
develop resource consumption models that take into account 37
different, possibly contradictory, views of the beneﬁts associ-
ated with resource consumption as well as the rewards for pro- 39
viding resources to the consumer population. Such models tend
to be very complex and only seldom amenable to analytical 41
solutions.
In this section we introduce the basic concepts and notations 43
for our model. First, we introduce price, utility, and satisfac-
tion functions; then we present our resource provider–consumer 45
model. To capture the objectives of the entities involved in the
computational economy we use: (i) a consumer utility func- 47
tion,0 u(r)1, to represent the utility provided to an indi-
vidual consumer, where r represents the amount of allocated 49
resource; (ii) a provider price function, p(r), imposed by a
resource provider, and (iii) a consumer satisfaction function,5 1
s(u(r),p(r)),0s1, to quantify the level of satisfaction; the
satisfaction depends on both the provided utility and the paid 53
price.
3.1. Price functions 55
We discuss the three pricing functions in Fig. 1(a). Given
the constant, , the three particular pricing functions we choose 57
are:
(a) The price per unit is constant regardless of the amount of 59
resources consumed (linear pricing):
p(r) =  · r. (1) 61
(b) Discourage consumption: The more resources are used, the
higher becomes the average unit price (super-linear pric- 63
ing):
p(r) =  · rd, (2) 65
where d>1. For this equation, we use d = 1.5 throughout
the remainder of the paper. 67
(c) Encourage consumption: The more resources are used, the
lower becomes the average unit price (sub-linear pricing): 69
p(r) =  · re, (3)
where e<1. For this equation, we use e = 0.5 throughout 71
the remainder of the paper.
We also analyze the effect of resource abundance; in this 73
case we deﬁne the load index  as the ratio of total amount of
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super-linear
linear
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
TL TH r 1.0
0
Unit Price

Fig. 1. (a) Sub-linear, linear, and super-linear price functions. (b) The unit price varies with , the load index of the provider.
allocated resources to the capacity of the provider and consider 1
three regions: low, medium, and high load index. We denote
the low, medium, and high regions as the interval of [0,TL), 3
[TL,TH], and (TH,1], respectively, as shown in Fig. 1(b).
The pricing strategy for each region is different. We consider 5
two models: EDL—encourage/discourage linear and EDN—
encourage/discourage non-linear. The choice of the TL, TH 7
is basically a policy decision. However, in order to have the
desired inﬂuence on the system as a whole, the three intervals 9
need to be of a sufﬁcient size. Values such as TL = 0.49
and TH = 0.51 make the target interval unreasonably small; 11
very low TL and very high TH values make the pricing strat-
egy degenerate into a constant price strategy. The values used 13
throughout this paper are TL = 0.3 and TH = 0.7.
For the ﬁrst model, the unit price is constant in each region, 15
but different in different regions, as deﬁned in Eq. (4), and
shown in Fig. 1(b). We introduce three prices, each correspond- 17
ing to a range of the system load: minimal, min, maximal, max,
and , the price corresponding to medium load. For low load 19
the providers use lower prices to encourage resource consump-
tion, but do not lower the price below min. For high load, the 21
providers gradually increase the price, up to max. The choice
of the min and max are a matter of policy, however, too low 23
values for min would make resources basically free for nodes
with low utilization, and very high values of max would make 25
resources too expensive. We used the values of max = 2 × ,
and min = 0.5 ×  throughout the remainder of the paper. 27
p(r)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 
min+

TL
(−min)
 
· r if  ∈[ 0,TL),
 · r if  ∈[ TL,TH],  
+
−TH
1.0−TH
(max−)
 
· r if  ∈ (TH,1.0].
(4)
For the second model, when  is low, the provider uses a sub-
linear price function; when  is high, the provider uses a super- 29
linear price function; otherwise, the provider uses a linear price
function as expressed below: 31
p(r) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 · re if  ∈[ 0,TL),
 · r if  ∈[ TL,TH],
 · rd if  ∈ (TH,1.0],
(5)
where e<1 and d>1. The choice of e and d follow similar 33
considerationslikethechoiceofparametersfortheEDLmodel:
we need to encourage and discourage the customers, while still 35
maintaining the prices in a justiﬁable range. In this paper we
are using the values of e = 0.5 and d = 1.5, which provide an 37
appropriate range of prices.
3.2. Utility function 39
The utility function should be a non-decreasing function of
r, i.e., we assume that the more resources are allocated to the 41
consumer, the higher the consumer utility is. However, when
enough resources have been allocated to the consumer, i.e., 43
some threshold is reached, an increase of allocated resources
would bring no improvement of the utility. On the other hand, 45
if the amount of resources is below some threshold the utility
is extremely low. Thus, we expect the utility to be a concave 47
function and reach saturation as the consumer gets all the re-
sources it can use effectively. These conditions are reﬂected by 49
the following equations:
du(r)
dr
0, lim
r→∞
du(r)
dr
= 0. (6) 51
For example, if a parallel application could use at most 100
nodes of a cluster, its utility reﬂected by a utility function does 53
not increase if its allocation increases from 100 to 110 nodes.
If we allocate less than 10 nodes then the system may spend 55
most of its time paging and experiencing cache misses and the
execution time would be prohibitively high. 57
Different functions can be used to model this behavior and
we choose one of them, a sigmoid: 59
u(r) =
(r/)
1 + (r/), (7)
where  and  are constants provided by the consumer, 2, 61
and  > 0. Clearly, 0u(r) < 1 and u() = 1
2.
A sigmoid is a tilted S-shaped curve that could be used to 63
represent the life cycles of living, as well as man-made, social,
or economical systems. It has three distinct phases: an incipient 65
or starting phase, a maturing phase, and a declining or aging
phase, as shown in Fig. 2(a). 67
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Fig. 2. (a) A sigmoid is used to model the utility function; a sigmoid includes three phases: the starting phase, the maturing phase, and the aging phase. (b)
The satisfaction function for a sigmoid utility function and three linear price functions with low, medium, and high unit price.
3.3. Satisfaction function 1
A consumer satisfaction function takes into account both the
utility provided to the consumer and the price paid for the re- 3
sources. For a given utility, the satisfaction function should in-
crease when the price decreases and, for a given price, the sat- 5
isfaction function should increase when the utility u increases.
These requirements are reﬂected as 7
s
p
0,
s
u
0. (8)
Furthermore, a normalized satisfaction function should satisfy 9
the following conditions:
• the degree of satisfaction, s(u(r),p(r)), for a given price 11
p(r), approaches the minimum, 0, when the utility, u(r),
approaches 0; 13
• the degree of satisfaction, s(u(r),p(r)), for a given price
p(r), approaches the maximum, 1, when the utility, u(r), 15
approaches inﬁnity;
• the degree of satisfaction, s(u(r),p(r)), for a given utility 17
u(r), approaches the maximum, 1, when the price, p(r),
approaches 0; and 19
• the degree of satisfaction, s(u(r),p(r)), for a given utility
u(r), approaches the minimum, 0, when the price, p(r), ap- 21
proaches inﬁnity.
These requirements are reﬂected as 23
∀p>0, lim
u→0
s(u,p) = 0, lim
u→∞
s(u,p) = 1, (9)
∀u>0, lim
p→0
s(u,p) = 1, lim
p→∞
s(u,p) = 0. (10) 25
A candidate satisfaction function is [40]:
s(u,p) = 1 − e−·u·p−
, (11) 27
where , , and  are appropriate positive constants. The sat-
isfaction function based upon the utility function in Eq. (7) is 29
normalized; given a reference price 	 we consider also a nor-
malized price function and we end up with a satisfaction func- 31
tion given by:
s(u,p) = 1 − e−·u·(p/	)−
. (12) 33
Because u and p are functions of r, satisfaction increases as
more resources are allocated, reaches an optimum, and then 35
declines, as shown in Fig. 2(b). The optimum satisfaction de-
pends upon the pricing strategy; not unexpectedly, the higher 37
the unit price, the lower the satisfaction.
The 3D surfaces representing the relationship s = s(r,) 39
between satisfaction s and the unit price  and amount of re-
sources r for several pricing functions (super-linear, linear, and 41
sub-linear) are presented in Fig. 3. As we can see from the cut
through the surfaces s = s(r,) at a constat  when we discour- 43
age consumption (super-linear pricing) the optimum satisfac-
tion is lower and occurs for fewer resources; when we encour- 45
age consumption (sub-linear pricing) the optimum satisfaction
is improved and occurs for a larger amount of resources. These 47
plots reassure us that the satisfaction function has the desired
behavior. 49
3.4. Resource provider–consumer model
Consider a system with n providers offering computing re- 51
sources and m consumers. To simplify the model, we assume
that the two sets are disjoint. Call U the set of consumers and 53
R the set of providers. The n providers are labeled 1 to n
and the m consumers are labeled 1 to m. Consider provider 55
Rj, 1j n, and consumer Ui, 1im, that could poten-
tially use resources of that provider. 57
Let rij denote the resource (deﬁned below) of Rj allocated to
consumer Ui and let uij denote its utility for consumer Ui. Let 59
pij denote the price paid by Ui to provider Rj. Let tij denote
the time Ui uses the resource provided by Rj. Let cj denote the 61
resource capacity of Rj, i.e., the amount of resources regulated
by Rj.6 3
The term “resource” here means a vector with components
indicating the actual amount of each type of resource: 65
rij = (r1
ij r2
ij ...rl
ij),
where l is a positive integer and rk
ij corresponds to the amount 67
of resource of the kth type. The structure of rij may reﬂect
the rate of CPU cycles, the physical memory required by the 69
application, the secondary storage, the number of nodes and
the interconnection bandwidth (for a multiprocessor system or 71
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Fig. 3. The relationship between satisfaction s and the unit price  and amount of resources r. The satisfaction function is based on a sigmoid utility function
and different price functions: (a) discourage consumption (super-linear); (b) linear; (c) encourage consumption (sub-linear); and (d) a cut through the three
surfaces at a constant .
a cluster), the network bandwidth (required to transfer data 1
to/from the site), the graphics capabilities, and so on.
The utility of resource of the kth type provided by Rj for 3
consumer Ui is a sigmoid:
uk
ij = u(rk
ij) =
(rk
ij/k
i)
k
i
1 + (rk
ij/k
i)
k
i
,
5
where k
i and k
i are constants provided by consumer Ui, k
i 2,
and k
i > 0. Clearly, 0 < u(rk
ij)<1 and u(k
i) = 1
2. 7
The overall utility of resources provided by Rj to Ui
is:
9
• the product over the set of resources provided by Rj, i.e.,
uij =
 l
k=1 uk
ij or 11
• the weighted average over the set of resources provided by 13
Rj, i.e., uij = 1
l
 l
k=1 ak
ijuk
ij, where ak
ij values are provided
by consumer Ui and
 l
k=1 ak
ij = 1. 15
Let pk
ij denote the price consumer Ui pays to provider Rj
for a resource of type k. The total price for consumer Ui for 17
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resources provided by provider Rj is 1
pij =
l  
k=1
pk
ij.
The total cost for consumer Ui for resources provided by 3
provider Rj is pij × tij.
Based on Eq. (12), we deﬁne the degree of satisfaction of Ui 5
for a resource of the kth type provided by provider Rj as
sk
ij(uk
ij,pk
ij) = 1 − e
−k
i uk
ij
k
i (pk
ij/	k
i )
−k
i
, k
i,	k
i,k
i,k
i > 0, 7
where k
i, k
i, and k
i are appropriate positive constants and 	k
i
is a reference price. 9
The overall satisfaction of consumer Ui for resources pro-
vided by Rj is:
11
• the product over the set of resources provided by Rj, i.e.,
sij =
 l
k=1 sk
ij,o r 13
• the weighted average over the set of resources provided by 15
Rj, i.e., sij = 1
l
 l
k=1 bk
ijsk
ij, where bk
ij values are provided
by consumer Ui and
 l
k=1 bk
ij = 1. 17
We conclude this section with an example. Let us consider a
system which has two resources: memory (measured in MB) 19
and computational power (measured in MHz). Let us consider
a client which has its utility function calculated by setting 21
m = 2000, m = 10 for the memory, while for the com-
putational power cp = 2000 and cp = 3. The shape of the 23
utility curve is shown in Fig. 4(left). The utility curve is al-
most linear for the computational power, while it has a steep 25
ramp for memory at the value of around 2000MB. A memory
allocation smaller than 1000MB has virtually no utility, while 27
adding extra memory above 3000MB yields very little bene-
ﬁt. The price curves are shown in Fig. 4(middle). The shapes 29
of the curves are justiﬁed by objective considerations: for in-
stance, high performance processors are an order of magnitude 31
more expensive than consumer grade processors. Finally, the
satisfaction function is calculated with the values for the mem- 33
ory being: m = 0.02, 	m = 0.6, m = 3 and m = 3, while
for computational power cp = 0.03, 	cp = 0.2, cp = 3 and 35
cp = 3. The satisfaction curves are shown in Fig. 4, (right).
We will assume that the overall satisfaction is the product of 37
the satisfaction for memory and computational power.
Let us now consider the case when the customer receives 39
four offers A, B, C, and D. The offers and the associated cost
and satisfaction values are summarized below: 41
Memory C. Cost Cost Total Satisfaction
power memory c. power cost
A 3000 2000 300 60 360 0.6676
B 2500 2500 250 83.5 333.5 0.8132
C 2300 2500 230 83.5 313.5 0.7574
D 3000 2550 300 129 429 0.4338
Under these conditions, the user will choose offer B, which 43
offers the highest satisfaction. Notice that B is neither the offer
with the largest amount of resources, nor the cheapest offer. 45
4. The role of brokers
In this paper, we concentrate on optimal resource manage- 47
ment policies. A policy is optimal when the satisfaction func-
tion, which reﬂects both the price paid to carry out a task and 49
the utility resulting from the completion of the task, reaches a
maximum. A broker attempts to operate at or near this opti- 51
mum.
The role of a broker is to mitigate access to resources. In 53
this paper, we consider provider–broker–consumer models that
involve the set of resource providers R, the set of consumers U,5 5
andbrokerB.Thesemodelsassumethataconsumermustgetall
of its resources from a single provider. Brokers have “societal 57
goals” and attempt to maximize the average utility and revenue,
as opposed to providers and consumers that have individualistic 59
goals; each provider wishes to maximize its revenue, while
each consumer wishes to maximize its utility and do so for 61
as the lowest cost possible. To reconcile the requirements of a
consumerandthecandidateproviders,abrokerchoosesasubset 63
of providers such that the satisfaction is above a high threshold
and all providers in the subset have equal chances to be chosen 65
by the consumer. We call the size of this subset satisﬁcing size,
and denote it by 
; the word “satisﬁce” was coined by Nobel 67
Prize winner Herbert Simon in 1957 to describe the desire to
achieve a minimal value of a variable instead of its maximum 69
[35].
The resource negotiation protocol consists of the following 71
steps:
(1) All providers reveal their capacity and pricing parameters 73
to the broker: ∀Rj ∈ R send vectors cj and j where each
element corresponds to one type of resource. 75
(2) A consumer Ui sends to the broker a request with the fol-
lowing information: 77
(a) the parameters of its utility function: vectors i and
i where each element corresponds to one type of 79
resource,
(b) the parameters of its satisfaction function: vectors i,8 1
i, i, and 	i where each element corresponds to one
type of resource, and 83
(c) the number of candidate resource providers to be re-
turned. 85
(3) The broker performs a brokering algorithm and returns a
list of candidate resource providers Ri to consumer Ui.8 7
(4) Consumer Ui selects the ﬁrst provider from Ri and veriﬁes
if the provider can allocate the required resources. If it 89
cannot, the consumer moves to the next provider from the
list until the resources are allocated by a provider Rj.9 1
(5) Rj notiﬁes the broker about the resource allocation to Ui.
The algorithm performed by the broker is summarized in Fig. 93
5. The amount of resources to be allocated is determined during
the algorithm according to a broker strategy. Simple strategies 95
would be to allocate the same amount of resources to every
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Fig. 4. Example of utility (left), price (middle) and satisfaction (right) curves for two resources: memory (upper row) and computational power (lower row).
Fig. 5. The algorithm performed by the broker. The consumer request, req, is elastic. It contains the parameters describing u and s, the utility and satisfaction
functions.  is the target utility and 
 is the satisﬁcing size. The cardinality speciﬁes the number of resource providers to be returned by the broker.
consumer, or to allocate to every consumer a random amount of 1
resources. A better strategy, used by our system, is to allocate
an amount of resources such that the utility of each type of 3
resource to the consumer reaches a certain target utility .T o
determine the amount of resources allocated to the consumer, 5
the broker uses Eq. 13(a) derived from the deﬁnition of u(r),
Eq. 13(b): 7
(a)r= e(ln( 
1−)/)+ln(),( b) u(r) =
(r/)
1 + (r/). (13)
Several quantities characterize the resource management policy 9
for broker B and its associated providers and consumers:
(a) Average hourly revenue. The average is over the set of 11
providers connected to broker B; the revenue of a provider
is the sum of revenues from all resources it controls. 13
(b) Request acceptance ratio. The ratio is the number of ac-
cepted requests over the number of requests submitted by 15
the consumers connected to broker B. A request is accepted
if a provider able to allocate resources exists, otherwise the 17
request is rejected and the corresponding satisfaction and
utility are set to 0. 19
(c) Average consumer satisfaction. The average is over the set
of all consumers connected to broker B.2 1
(d) Average consumer utility. This average is over the set of
consumers connected to broker B.2 3
In our model, a broker receives a percentage of the revenues
collected by the providers connected to it. More sophisticated 25
mechanisms are possible, for example, in addition to the per-
centage of the revenues collected from the providers, a broker 27
may receive a premium from consumers based upon their level
of satisfaction. This policy would encourage brokers to balance 29
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the interests of providers and consumers. Different brokers may 1
have different policies and may be required to disclose the aver-
age values for critical parameters, such as  and 
, and their fee 3
structure, during the initial negotiation phase; thus, consumers
and providers will have the choice to work with a broker that 5
best matches their own objective.
5. A simulation study 7
Market-oriented resource allocation algorithms are very dif-
ﬁcult to analyze analytically. To understand the behavior of the 9
system we conducted a simulation study using YAES [9]. A
thorough investigation would require for multiple brokers, but 11
the model is already very complex and would require addi-
tional protocols for broker selection and renegotiations so we 13
are considering the case of a single broker.
The resource allocated by provider Rj to consumer Ui are 15
represented by a resource vector rij = (r1
ij r2
ij ...rl
ij). For ex-
ample, if the kth component is secondary storage, then rk
ij = 17
20GB is the amount of secondary storage provided by Rj to
consumer Ui. The associated utility and satisfaction vectors 19
are: uij = (u1
ij u2
ij ...u l
ij) and sij = (s1
ij s2
ij ... sl
ij). The
demand to capacity ratio for resource type k is the ratio of 21
the amount requested by all consumers to the total capacity of
providers for resource k,
 
j ck
j. The level of demand is lim- 23
ited by the sigmoid shape of the utility curve and the ﬁnite ﬁ-
nancial resources of the consumers. In the computation of the 25
demand–capacity ratio, for each consumer and each resource,
it is assumed that for the requested rk
ij value the corresponding 27
utility value uk
ij = 0.9, i.e., the consumers request an amount
of rk
ij that results in uk
ij = 0.9. The demand to capacity ratio 29
vector for all resource types is  = (1 2 ...l). For the sake
of simplifying the simulation, we only consider the case when 31
1 = 2 = ...= l = .
We run multiple simulation experiments for each case (50 33
runs/case) and compute 95% conﬁdence intervals for the re-
sults. The parameters for our experiments are:
35
• —target utility for the consumers,
• 
—satisﬁcing size; reﬂects the choices given to the consumer 37
by the broker, and
• —demand to capacity ratio; measures the commitment and, 39
thus, the load placed upon providers.
We study the evolution in time of:
41
• average hourly revenue,
• request acceptance ratio (the ratio of resource requests 43
granted to total number of requests),
• average consumer satisfaction, and 45
• average consumer utility.
We investigate the performance of the model for different 47
target utilities, , satisﬁcing sizes, 
, and demand to capacity
ratios, . We study several scenarios, for the linear (Eq. (1)), 49
EDN (Eq. (5)), and EDL (Eq. (4)) pricing strategies.
We simulate a system of 100 clusters and one broker. The 51
number of nodes of each cluster is a random variable normally
distributed with the mean of 50 and the standard deviation of 53
30. Each node is characterized by a resource vector containing
the CPU rate, the main memory, and the disk capacity. For 55
example, the resource vector for a node with one 2GHz CPU,
1GB of memory, and a 40GB disk is (2GHz, 1GB, 40GB). 57
Initially, there is no consumer in the system. Consumers ar-
rive with an inter-arrival time exponentially distributed with the 59
mean of 2s. The service time tij is exponentially distributed
with the mean of  seconds. By varying the  value we modify 61
demand–capacity ratio so that we can study the behavior of the
system under different loads. 63
The request is elastic, i.e., instead of requesting a precise
amount, consumers only specify their utility and satisfaction 65
functions. The parameters of the utility and satisfaction func-
tions are uniformly distributed in the intervals shown in Table 67
2. A request provides the parameters of the utility function, 
and , for each element of the resource vector (CPU, Mem- 69
ory, Disk). We generate  and  such that with a utility of
0.9, the CPU rate, memory space, and disk space of a request 71
are exponentially distributed with means of 2GHz, 4GB, and
80GB, and ranges of [0.1GHz, 100GHz], [0.1GB, 200GB], 73
and [0.1GB, 1000GB], respectively. More precisely, for each
element: (a) we generate the amount r according to the cor- 75
responding distribution; (b) we choose a value for ; and (c)
set u = 0.9 and compute the corresponding value of . For a 77
resource vector, we let the overall utility be the product of the
utilities of its scalar resources, and the overall satisfaction be 79
the product of the satisfaction for its scalar resources.
When we study the effect of the target utility ,w eu s e
 = 81
1 and  = 1.0; when we study the effect of 
,w eu s e =
0.9 and  = 1.0; and when we study the effect of , we use 83
 = 0.9 and 
 = 1. We also compare the system performance
of our scheme for several 
 values with a random strategy.8 5
In this case, we randomly choose a provider from the set of
all providers, without considering the satisfaction function. To 87
make the model more realistic, we allow a resource provider
to reject a consumer’s request if the available resources are 89
insufﬁcient to permit both satisfaction and utility to reach 0.1.
Figs. 6–9 summarize our ﬁndings. In each case, we present 91
the three pricing strategies, linear, EDN, and EDL. The param-
eters for the graphs illustrating the effect of the target utility, 93
, at the top of the ﬁgure are: 
 = 1,  = 1.0, and  = 0.8,
0.85, 0.9, and 0.95. The graphs illustrating the effect of the 95
satisﬁcing size, 
, in the middle of the ﬁgure use the following
parameters:  = 0.9,  = 1.0, and 
 = 1, 10, and 20; for the 97
random strategy, 
 =| R |= 50. The parameters for the graphs
illustrating the effect of the demand to capacity ratio, , at the 99
bottom of the ﬁgure are:  = 0.9, 
 = 1, and  = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5,
and 2.0. 101
The average hourly revenue is an important consideration for
resource providers. We notice that the three pricing strategies 103
exhibit similar behavior: the average hourly revenue increases
rapidly during the transient period, reaches a maximum, and 105
then converges to a steady state, as shown in Fig. 6. For the
same value of the target utility, , the steady state value for the 107
linear and the EDN pricing strategies are close to one another
and almost half of those for EDL, as shown in the top row of 109
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Table 2
The parameters for the simulation are uniformly distributed
Parameter CPU Memory Disk
 [5, 10] [5, 10] [5, 10]
 [0.4, 0.9] [0.5, 1.5] [10, 30]
 [0.02, 0.04] [0.02, 0.04] [0.02, 0.04]
 [2, 4] [2, 4] [2, 4]
 [2, 4] [2, 4] [2, 4]
	 [10, 20] [20, 40] [400, 800]
The parameters and the corresponding intervals are shown.
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Fig. 6. Average hourly revenue vs. time (in seconds) for different target utilities,  (top), satisﬁcing sizes, 
 (middle), and demand to capacity ratios,  (bottom).
The three pricing strategies are: linear (left), EDN (center), and EDL (right).
Fig. 6. In all cases, the larger  the higher the revenue. In these 1
simulations, 
 = 1 (the broker provides a single choice) and the
demand to capacity ratio is  = 1.0. We believe that resource 3
fragmentation is the reason why the steady state value is lower
than the maximum attained at the end of the transient period. 5
Resource fragmentation is an undesirable phenomena where
the amount of resources available cannot meet the target utility 7
value for any request and resources remain idle. This effect
is more pronounced for larger utility values, for example, for 9
 = 0.95 the steady state value is some 20% lower than its
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Fig. 7. Request acceptance ratio vs. time (in seconds) for different target utilities,  (top), satisﬁcing sizes, 
 (middle), and demand to capacity ratios, 
(bottom). The three pricing strategies are: linear (left), EDN (center), and EDL (right).
corresponding maximum, while for  = 0.8 the steady state 1
value is close to its corresponding maximum.
The next question is if larger satisﬁcing size affects the av- 3
erage revenue. A small value of 
 limits the number of choices
to consumers and this restriction leads to lower average hourly 5
revenues. In our experiments  = 0.9 and  = 1.0, as shown in
the middle row of Fig. 6. EDN and EDL are superior to linear 7
pricing. The larger the 
, the higher the average hourly rev-
enue for the provider. The random strategy, which corresponds 9
to the maximum value of 
 =| R | leads to the highest average
hourly revenue. 11
Lastly, we see that the demand to capacity ratio also has
an impact upon the average hourly revenue that is larger for 13
larger  for all three pricing strategies, as shown in the bottom
row of Fig. 6. The conclusion we draw from these results is 15
that the average hourly revenue increases when we provide a
higher target utility ( closer to 1), increase the satisﬁcing size 17
(larger 
), and increase the demand to capacity ratio, , and that
differential pricing strategies (EDN and EDL) are preferable to 19
the linear one.
The request acceptance ratio for various pricing policies and 21
choices of parameters is shown in Fig. 7. We ﬁnd that the
request acceptance ratio shows variations during the transient 23
period but converges to constant values in the steady state. The
EDN pricing strategy appears optimal, leading to steady state 25
values close to 1.0 for virtually every choice of parameters,
except for the random 
. The steady state values for the linear 27
and EDL strategies are also high, with values larger than 0.95,
but the exact amount is determined by the values of ,  and 
.2 9
We ﬁnd that the higher the values of any of these parameters,
the higher the request acceptance ratio. 31
The three pricing strategies lead to very different consumer
satisfaction for the same set of parameters of the simulation, 33
even though the qualitative behavior is somehow similar in that
theaverageconsumersatisfactiondecreasesduringthetransient 35
period and then increases and reaches a stable value in steady
state, as shown in Fig. 8. EDN appears to be best strategy. The 37
larger the target utility, the lower the consumer satisfaction. The
highest steady state average satisfaction is about 80% when 39
 = 0.8 and when we use the EDN strategy as compared with
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Fig. 8. Average consumer satisfaction vs. time (in seconds) for different target utilities,  (top), satisﬁcing sizes, 
 (middle), and demand to capacity ratio, 
(bottom). The three pricing strategies are: linear (left), EDN (center), and EDL (right).
less than 50% for EDL and about 70% for linear pricing strat- 1
egy in terms of 
. The highest satisfaction occurs when 
 = 1.
Though this seems counterintuitive it is well justiﬁed; in this 3
case the broker directs the consumer to that resource provider
that best matches the request. When we select at random one 5
provider from the list of all providers supplied by the broker we
observe the lowest average consumer satisfaction because we 7
have a high probability to select a less than optimal match for
a given request. Recall that the optimal match is the top ranked 9
element of the list of providers supplied by the broker. We also
notice that a high demand to capacity ratio has a negative im- 11
pact upon user satisfaction. The largest impact of the demand
to capacity ratio upon the steady state average consumer satis- 13
faction is visible for the linear pricing strategy, when the aver-
age consumer satisfaction ranges from about 55% for  = 2.0 15
to about 75% for  = 0.5.
For the same set of parameters of the simulation the three 17
pricing strategies lead to slightly different average consumer
utility values, but the qualitative behavior is similar, as shown 19
in Fig. 9. The average consumer utility decreases slowly during
the transient period because of system fragmentation; some 21
resources are allocated to consumers due to their cheaper price,
although they are not enough to allow the utility to reach the 23
target value, . In steady state, the average utility reaches a
stable value. Overall, the differentiated pricing strategies, EDN 25
and EDL, perform better and reach higher steady state values.
The higher the target utility, the larger the actual utility; the 27
highest steady state utility is about 70% for  = 0.95 for EDN
andEDL,asshowninthetopofFig.9.Thelargerthesatisﬁcing 29
size, the higher the actual utility; the random strategy leads to
90% utility, as shown in the middle of Fig. 9. The lower the 31
demand to capacity ratio, the higher the satisfaction.
Fig. 10 summarizes the effect of the three pricing strategies 33
upon the four quantities we monitored in our experiments, for
a particular set of parameters:  = 0.9, 
 = 1, and  = 1.0. 35
EDL allows the highest average hourly revenue while the linear
pricing strategy leads to the lowest one, as shown in Fig. 10(a). 37
EDN leads to the highest request acceptance ratio while EDL
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Fig. 9. Average consumer utility vs. time (in seconds) for different target utilities,  (top), satisﬁcing sizes, 
 (middle), and demand to capacity ratios, 
(bottom). The three pricing strategies: linear (left), EDN (center), and EDL (right).
leads to the lowest one, as shown in Fig. 10(b). EDN leads to 1
the highest consumer satisfaction while EDL leads to the lowest
one, as shown in Fig. 10(c). EDL allows the highest average 3
hourly revenue while linear pricing strategy leads to the lowest
one, as shown in Fig. 10(d). 5
6. Conclusions and future work
Economicmodelsarenotoriouslydifﬁculttostudy.Thecom- 7
plexity of the utility, price, and satisfaction-based models pre-
cludes analytical studies and in this paper we report on a simu- 9
lation study. The goal of our simulation study is to validate our
choice of utility, price, and satisfaction function, to study the 11
effect of the many parameters that characterize our model, and
to get some intuition regarding the transient and the steady state 13
behavior of our models. We are primarily interested in quali-
tative rather than quantitative results, i.e., we are interested in 15
trends, rather than actual numbers.
In our model the actual shape of the utility function is con- 17
trolled by the parameters dictated primarily by the application.
On the other hand, the satisfaction function reﬂects mostly the 19
user’s constraints. The model inhibits selﬁsh behavior: greedy
consumers pay a hefty price and greedy providers who insist 21
on high prices are avoided. The satisfaction function ensures
a balance between the amount of resources consumed and the 23
price paid for them.
The function of a broker is to monitor the system and set  25
and 
 for optimal performance. For example, if the broker per-
ceives that the average consumer utility is too low, it has two 27
choices: increase  or increase 
. At the same time, the sys-
tem experiences an increase of the average hourly revenue and 29
a decrease of the average consumer satisfaction. The fact that
increasing utility could result in lower satisfaction seems coun- 31
terintuitive, but reﬂects the consequences of allocating more
resources; we increase the total cost possibly beyond the op- 33
timum predicated by the satisfaction function. The simulation
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Fig. 10. (a) The average hourly revenue, (b) the request acceptance ratio, (c) the average consumer satisfaction, and (d) the average consumer utility vs. time
(in seconds) for 
 = 1,  = 0.9, and  = 1.0, with different price functions.
results shown in this paper are consistent with those in [5,6] 1
where we use linear pricing and simpler models based upon a
synthetic quantity to represent a vector of resources. 3
The EDL pricing strategy leads to the highest average con-
sumer utility and the highest average hourly revenue, while it 5
gives the lowest request acceptance ratio and the lowest aver-
age consumer satisfaction. The EDN pricing strategy allows the 7
highest request acceptance ratio and the highest average con-
sumer satisfaction, while it leads to lower average consumer 9
utility and average hourly revenue than EDL. It is also remark-
able that the average consumer satisfaction does not track the 11
average consumer utility. This shows the importance of the sat-
isfaction function. 13
One could argue that in practice it would be rather difﬁcult
for users to specify the parameters of their utility and satisfac- 15
tion function. Of course, this is true in today’s environments,
but entirely feasible in intelligent environments where such in- 17
formation could be provided by societal services [7]. The ad-
vantages of elastic requests is likely to motivate the creation of 19
such services in the computational economy of the future.
Even though we limit our analysis to a single broker system, 21
we are conﬁdent that the most important conclusions we are
able to draw from our model, namely that:
23
(i) Given a particular set of model parameters the satisfaction
reaches an optimum; this value represents the perfect bal- 25
ance between the utility and the price paid for resources.
(ii) The satisfaction does not track the utility. 27
(iii) Differentiated pricing perform better than linear pricing.
(iv) Brokers can effectively control the computing economy. 29
will still be valid for multiple broker systems. In such an en-
vironment, individual brokers could enforce different policies; 31
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providers and consumers could join the one that best matches 1
their individual goals. The other simplifying assumptions for
our analysis, e.g., the uniformity of the demand to capacity ratio 3
for all resources available at a consumer’s site, will most likely
have second order effects. The restriction we impose by requir- 5
ing a consumer to obtain all necessary resources from a single
broker is also unlikely to signiﬁcantly affect our ﬁndings. 7
It is very difﬁcult to make a direct comparison between sys-
tems based on different models with different objective func- 9
tions. Our results are qualitative rather than quantitative; the
goal of our work is to show that our formal mathematical model 11
captures and predicts performance trends. In Table 1 we com-
pare the features of several systems. Performance results for ex- 13
isting systems are rarely reported and when they are available it
would be hard to calibrate them. We are conﬁdent that a model 15
that formalizes the selﬁsh goals of consumers and providers, as
well as societal goals, has a signiﬁcant potential. Our intention 17
is to draw the attention of the community to the potential of
utility, price, and satisfaction-based resource allocation mod- 19
els. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to cover all angles
of such a complex model. 21
A fair number of questions require further investigations in-
cluding: (a) Are there better alternatives to the utility, price, and 23
satisfaction functions we introduced? (b) Is the policy aiming
to achieve maximum satisfaction sound, e.g., how should we 25
take into account the societal importance of activities carried
out by individual resource consumers? (c) How can we apply 27
the models to more complex networks of resource managers?
(d) What composition rules should be used to describe the util- 29
ity and/or the satisfaction for a group of consumers? (e) How
can we deﬁne more complex utility functions that take into 31
account additional constraints related to system reliability and
deadlines? Future work involves also the study of more com- 33
plex systems including policy makers and multiple brokers.
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